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Abstract:  
Syndicated loans and the number of lending relationships have raised growing attention. All 
other terms being equal (e.g. seniority), syndicated loans provide larger payments (in basis 
points) to lenders funding larger amounts. The paper explores empirically the motivation for 
such a price discrimination on sovereign syndicated loans in the period 1990-1997. First 
evidence suggests larger premia are associated with renegotiation prospects. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that price discrimination is aimed at reducing the number of lenders and 
thus the expected renegotiation costs. However, larger payment discrimination is also 
associated with more targeted market segments and with larger loans, thus minimising 
borrowing costs and/or attempting to widen the circle of lending relationships in order to 
successfully raise the requested amount. 
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1. Introduction 
Loan syndication and the number of lending relationships have raised a growing attention in 
the recent literature. Costs of borrowing are found to be consistent with agency and renegotiation 
issues. The paper suggests an innovative empirical investigation of the price discrimination on 
sovereign private debts. The sovereign borrower is different from the corporate agent as no 
collaterals and enforcement means are available. Therefore, the latter is subject to three main 
borrowing constraints, i.e. minimising agency costs, increasing the finance raising capacity, and 
reducing the renegotiation costs. The literature have found these three issues are interrelated with 
the number of lenders. 
The syndicated loan is a single facility financed by a group of bank under the same 
conditions. Nevertheless, all other terms being equal (e.g. seniority), lenders’ returns increase in 
basis points in function of the committed amount. Terms are predefined by the borrower together 
with his arrangers before the syndication is launched. The amount related premium is reflected in 
the up-front fees (the up-front fee is a fee paid at the signature of the contract and before any 
tranche of the loan is yet drawn down). The empirical study explores the motivation for the 
presence of such a price discrimination. It is based on a sample of 100 loans issued or guaranteed 
by sovereign agents between 1990 and 1997. 
I find expected costs associated with renegotiations and information asymmetries have a 
positive impact on the price gap, thus being likely to reduce the number of joining lenders. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that renegotiation costs are an increasing function of the number of 
lenders (Bolton and Sharfstein (1996), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), Brunner and Krahnen 
(2001)) as well as the “common pool” issue (Morris and Shin (2002)). However, I actually find 
little evidence of price discrimination having a negative impact on the number of financial 
institutions joining the syndicate. Instead, price discrimination is to a large extent motivated by the 
size of the loan. Results also show that the larger up-front payment gap is actually designed to   2 
target a larger number of lenders. This is consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Machauer 
and Weber (2000) which show that the number of bank relationships is foremost determined by the 
borrower size. Therefore, I find loan size implies larger costs. The latter are not reflected in the 
spread, as unsuccessfully investigated in the past, but in the front-end payments. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section I describe more in details the theory 
behind the empirical investigation. Section 3 contains the description of the empirical models. In 
section 4 the sampling procedure, the actuarial methodology, and the data set are described. The 
results and their interpretation are reported in section 5. Section 6 presents the estimate robustness 
analysis. The last section provides concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Syndicated loans and the optimal number of lenders 
A syndicated loan is a single credit facility financed by a group of banks under the same 
contracting terms. All other terms being equal, increasing payment in percentage points is, 
however, usually provided to lenders as a function of their committed amounts. The increasing 
scale is reflected in the so-called up-front fee.
1 
The main motivation for the spread on up-front fees is traditionally related to the 
compensation for the individual lender’s higher exposure and risk-aversion. However, it clearly has 
an impact on the number of lenders as well as on the cost of borrowing. Indeed, provided a larger 
spread incurs higher borrowing costs, the borrower is likely to be attempting to reduce other costs 
related to the larger set of creditors, in particular renegotiation costs. 
The impact of the number of lenders on contracting costs has been well investigated. It is 
mainly associated with information collection and renegotiation costs. The asymmetric information 
approach (Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992)) argues a close and repeated lending 
relationship, reflected by the reduced number of lenders, decreases information asymmetries and 
the relative costs. This affects the smaller and less public borrower. On the other hand, the smaller 
                                                 
1 Rhodes (2001) provides a valuable description of the syndication process.   3 
number of lenders also increases every lender’s own voting rights in the event of a financial 
distress. The lending ‘monopoly’ also may result in a sort of ‘hold-up’ increasing borrowing costs. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) demonstrates there is an optimal debt structure that balances 
these effects. The higher number of lenders will deter the manager to default strategically that is to 
divert cash. However, facing a liquidity shortage beyond the manager’s control, the inevitable 
distress will incur higher renegotiation cost due to the lack of coordination among lenders. 
A recent line of research (Morris and Shin (2002)) highlighted the ‘common pool’ problem 
due to the coordination failure, i.e. even if the project is feasible, a creditor may be tempted to seize 
some assets and lead the borrower to financial distress. Therefore reducing the number of banks 
will reduce the probability that such an event occurs. 
First empirical studies pointed out the positive impact of bank loan issues on the value of 
the firm contrasting with the insignificant impact of public debt issues (James (1987)), and more 
specifically loan renewals (Lummer and McConnel (1989)). Further analyses validated that the 
borrower has a larger set of lenders as the amount of asymmetric information declines (Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) and Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)) while coordination is welfare improving 
(Brunner and Krahnen (2001)). The value of the syndicated loan is also found to be a negative 
function of the number of syndicated lenders believed to be increasing renegotiations costs (Preece 
and Mullineaux (1996)) and the credit rating of the lending institution (Billett et al. (1995)). This 
provides evidence of the renegotiation costs affecting the asset value. The weak creditor rights and 
poor legal enforcement are associated with more scattered ownership structure on project finance 
loan (Esty and Megginson (2001)) providing evidence of international syndication is aimed to deter 
strategic default rather than to enhance monitoring or facilitate renegotiations. My study belongs to 
this line of research. 
2.3. What is different about a sovereign? 
The sovereign agent is the state or national entities which act on behalf of the state (usually 
government entities and the central bank). State representative individuals and property goods are   4 
not subject to foreign national legislation. In this context, although a threat on the sovereign’s 
assets (e.g. trade) somewhat exists (Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Rose (2002)), debt repayment is 
reputation motivated because the lenders would presumably deny the defaulter future access to 
foreign-currency debt and prevent from consumption smoothing (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Cole 
et. al (1995), Grossman and Han (1999)). 
Therefore, the default is declared no sooner than when the borrower had called for a 
moratorium on debt repayments. Although there exists the custom-rule London Club, there is no 
bankruptcy code as such (Eichengreen and Portes (1995)). 
The last remarks yield important comments. To the sovereign debtor chiefly matters 
reducing borrowing and renegotiation costs. Provided the absence of a bankruptcy code that 
protects the distressed borrower and the lack of coordination among lenders, the fewer the 
participants in the renegotiations are, the better off is the distressed sovereign. Secondly, costs due 
to information asymmetries will also be reduced by limiting the number of creditors. 
On the other hand, alike firms, the sovereign also looks to prevent any information hold-up 
likely to happen with too few banks. A larger set of lenders also gives access to larger amounts. 
Moreover, in the absence of bankruptcy code, more than a firm, the sovereign will pay attention to 
the “common pool problem” (Morris and Shin (2002)). 
The larger is the spread on up-front fees, the higher are borrowing costs. The spread yields 
higher committing amounts, thus reducing the number of financial institutions participating to the 
syndicate. The payment is aimed to cover for other costs resulting from the number of creditors. In 
particular, the larger is the liquidity available to the sovereign borrower, the more likely he will try 
to extend the number of banks to have access to higher amounts in the future. The fact that 
available cash is of a lower amount will make the borrower willing to reduce the number of banks 
to prepare likely renegotiations, and therefore enlarge the spread and make him pay more.   5 
2.4. Quantity-based price discrimination and lending amounts 
An alternative explanation for the price discrimination on syndicated loans follows the line 
of research on quantity based price discrimination. The borrower will compensate lenders 
differently, penalising the lower committer. The borrower thus taps various lending market 
segments, thus attempting to minimise borrowing costs and/or increase borrowing capacities. 
Although the literature provides a wide range of illustrations, quantity based price 
discrimination is hardly documented on financial products. However, the non-linear pattern of 
syndication pricing will let the borrower decrease his borrowing costs the same way the monopolist 
increases his profits. The intuition is as follows. The monopolist borrower offers a relatively low 
lending amount to the low-demand lender. The borrower thus captures the low-supply lender 
surplus and reduces the high-demand costs. The borrower hence enlarges the spectrum of lending 
patterns and by doing so the number of lenders. The reasoning follows Mirrlees (1971). 
Alternatively, the borrower increases the price difference and add several ranks to reach 
several lending markets attempting to expand the number of lending relationships. The motivation 
is the size of the loan which is related to the size of the firm (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Machauer 
and Weber (2000)). Although previous research found little evidence of the number of banking 
relationship affecting the interest spread, additional cost might be reflected in the front-end 
payments. 
3. Model specifications 
3.1. The number of participants in sovereign syndicated loans 
The first model explores the impact of the fees spread on the number of banks joining the 
syndicate. The model of syndicated lenders to be estimated is:   6 
Number of joining lendersi,j  =  Constant + F0.Dummiesj 
  + f1.Up-front fees spreadi  (1) 
  + f2. Loan amounti 
  +f3. Number of arrangersi
 
  + Errori,j 
where a subscript i indicates that the variable refers to the ith loan observation. Similarly subscript j 
and k respectively indicate a variable regarding the jth country. Upper-case coefficients indicate 
vectors. 
The country dummies correct for specific effects of highly represented countries in the data 
set, namely Turkey and India. The loan amount is reported in constant billions of 1995 US dollars. 
The spread on the up-front fees is calculated as the difference between the lowest and the highest 
fees values in percentage points. This provides with the additional cost on the loan. 
This model is aimed at verifying that the spread on payments indeed contributes to reducing 
or increasing the number of lenders. Therefore, f1 is expected to be negative if the borrower intends 
to reduce renegotiation costs, and positive if price discrimination is aimed to reduce borrowing 
costs. By contrast, f2 is expected to have either a positive sign. 
3.2. The determinants of the discrimination on lending compensations 
The second model is intended to measure the impact of the determinants of financial 
distress and volatility on the spread. The model specification for the price discrimination calculated 
as the difference between top and bottom end fees is:   7 
Fees spreadi,j,k  =  Constant + Y0.Dummiesi.k 
  + y1.Loan amounti 
  + y2.Liquidityj,k 
  + y3.Solvencyj,k  (2) 
  + y4.Public informationj,k 
  + y5.Variation of incomej,k 
  + Errori,j,k 
where a subscript i indicates that the variable refers to the ith loan observation. Coefficients are real 
terms. Similarly subscripts j and k respectively indicate a variable regarding the jth country and kth 
year. 
The up-front fees spread, the loan amount and the dummies are the same as described 
previously. The proxy for liquidity equals the ratio of the amount of foreign currency reserves 
available to the sovereign by the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) short-term debt. This 
indicator is used in Eichengreen and Mody (2000). The ratios of reserves to imports and short-term 
debt to exports are two alternative proxies. However, results showed they added no information in 
the model estimates. The liquidity variable indicates the probability of a temporary foreign-
currency shortage. In the sovereign debt perspective, this is assumed to indicate that default and the 
subsequent credit disruption is not necessarily maximising the country's aggregated utility. Instead, 
the sovereign will seek to renegotiate the loan arrangements. The liquidity variable, hence, 
indicates the perspective of renegotiations rather than debt repudiation. Therefore, the borrower 
will seek to reduce the number of lending relationships so that renegotiations become less costly. 
Thus, the sign of y2 is expected to be positive, thus increasing the difference between the lowest 
and the highest committing bank. 
The proxy for solvency is the ratio of the total amount of PPG long-term debt (lifetime more 
than a year) relative to GNP. Solvency in the sovereign debt literature indicates that the liabilities 
are of a larger amount than the expected cash-flows. In this case, credit disruption is unlikely to be 
a credible threat to the sovereign debtor. Unlike the liquidity constraint, solvency is expected to   8 
affect very little the spread since the default risk is already reflected by the interest rate premium 
itself. Therefore, y3 is expected to be insignificant. 
The last variable is an indicator for the presence of public information about the borrower 
on the markets. This is proxied by the ratio of the PPG total private creditor debt of the country 
(bonds plus banking debt) relative to the total amount of PPG LDC debt. Note that an alternative is 
a dummy variable indicating the presence of a bond market which would reflect all public 
information in the traded yield. y4 is expected to be negative. 
If instead price discrimination is intended to tap different market segments and minimise the 
borrowing costs, both the price discrimination scale and the number of offered contracts will have a 
positive impact on the number of lenders. 
3.3 Endogeneity of the number of lenders to price discrimination 
Although the pricing is determined beforehand, the price discrimination is likely to be 
determined endogenously by the targeted number of lenders. In the third model, the number of 
joining lenders is added in model (2) as a determinant of the fees difference to form model: 
Fees spreadi,j,k  =  Constant + Y0.Dummiesi.k 
  + y1
’.Number of joining lendersi 
  + y2
’.Liquidityj,k 
  + y3
’
.Solvencyj,k  (2’) 
  + y4
’.Public informationj,k 
  + y5
’.Variation of incomej,k 
  + Errori,j,k 
The model defined by equations (1)-(2’) cannot however be estimated using ordinary least-
squares, for each model includes amongst its explanatory variables the dependent variable of the 
other model. Consequently, the endogenous variables will be correlated with the error terms. This 
will be tested. The result is the inconsistency of the estimates using the ordinary least-squares. 
Two-stage least-squares provides consistent estimates of the coefficients and disturbances. For this   9 
the model needs to be identified. A necessary condition of identification of the equation is that the 
number of exogenous variables excluded from the equation must not be less than the number of 
endogenous variables included in that equation. The identification condition is satisfied in each 
equation of model (1)-(2’). 
3.4 The number of arranging banks 
The study extends to the number of arranging (or “mandated”) banks, which I believe is of 
high relevance to the present study. The arrangers are mainly large banks. Although managing 
banks are usually part of the pool of lenders, they receive a separate undisclosed payment. The 
group of arrangers build up the syndicate and their credibility along with their business partnerships 
constitute an asset for the loan issuer. I investigate the impact of information asymmetries on the 
number of arrangers. I suspect the larger is the loan and the larger is the asymmetry of information 
between the loan issuer and the markets, the larger the number of arrangers will be. Thus, the 
model of the number of arranging banks is: 
Number of arrangersi,j,k  =  Constant + G0.Dummiesi.k 
  + g1.Loan amounti 
  + g2.Liquidityj,k 
  + g3.Solvencyj,k  (3) 
  + g4.Public informationj,k 
  + g5.Variation of incomej,k 
  + Errori,j,k 
where a subscript i indicates that the variable refers to the ith loan observation. Similarly 
subscript j and k respectively indicate a variable regarding the jth country and kth year. Upper-case 
coefficients indicate vectors. 
4. Sampling and data description 
The sample of contracts is assembled from various issues of the International Financing 
Review (IFR) which is the benchmark magazine among loan syndication practitioners. The sample   10 
is composed of 130 syndicated loans issued or guaranteed by LDC sovereigns between January 
1990 and December 1997
2 which also report up-front payments. The sample includes all types of 
loans except for Islamic financings, issued by sovereigns located in 28 countries.
3 However, of the 
130 observations, 29 are reported with missing fees at the top or bottom ends making the 
calculation of the difference between the top and bottom fees impossible.
4 Moreover, one 
observation benefits from a security and is therefore deleted.
5 Therefore, the final sample includes 
100 observations representing 23 countries. Of these 100 observations, 85 report the number of 
banks joining the syndicate that is necessary for estimating Model (1). Exogenous variables report 
is complete except for three contracts missing the variability of per capita income in the last five 
years.
6 Descriptive details are presented in Table I and II. 
The average bottom and top fees are respectively of 0.390% and 0.550% making the 
average spread on the up-front payments as large as 15.8 basis points. This represents a substantial 
premium of 40.3% relative to the lowest commitment fee. This will cost the borrower a maximum 
amount of 181.9 thousands US dollars for the average 115.1 million US dollars loan. Note however 
that the average up-front fee is substantially lower than in the sample described by Hallak (2001) in 
which the weighted up-front fee was found as high as 0.743% in average on the period between 
1983 to 1997. The bottom and top participation fees respective means are however similar to the 
sample described in Esty and Megginson (2001) on international project finance (36.9-53.1bp). 
Moreover, there are substantial differences among countries without evident patterns. 
The number of lenders per loan are rather heterogeneous too. The mean varies between 6 
(Malaysia) and 70 (Thailand). However, preliminary data screening lets no correlation appear 
                                                 
2 The status was verified in the articles of the company, where it should be stated that the national sovereign agent will 
make sure the company will meet its (foreign) obligations. 
3 Islamic Credit is an equity type of credit that carries no interests. My sample included one Islamic loan only. The 
facility is the second tranche of a credit signed by Turkish Grained Board (TMO) on 18 September 1997 and 
guaranteed by the Republic of Turkey. The first tranche is however a regular term loan and therefore has been left in 
the sample (see for instance IFR No. 1191, 12 July 1997, p. 102-103). 
4 However, the observation remains suitable for the study if only the lead-manager fee is missing. Each arranger usually 
obtains top management ranking in the syndicate and hardly discloses his own total compensation. 
5 Zambian copper conundrum loan guaranteed by Zambian Ministry of Finance, signed on 17 July 1997. “The principal 
outstanding is at least 150% covered by copper contracts” (IFR No. 1181 May 3 1997, p.58). 
6 Oman 1996, and Slovenia 1993, 1996. Slovenia entered international debt markets early after its creation.   11 
between these three parameters of the loan, namely the total number of lenders, the up-front fees 
difference and the size of the loan. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The number of banks joining the syndicate and the renegotiation costs 
Tables IV and V summarise the ordinary and two-stage least-squares estimates of the 
model’s structural parameters. The Number of joining equations yield several insights. Results 
show that the number of banks joining the syndicate is mainly determined by loan characteristics. 
The amount of debt sought in markets has a strong positive impact at 0.01 level. Similarly to Esty 
and Megginson (2001), the loan lifetime also has a significant negative impact on the number of 
lenders joining the syndicate at standard levels (0.05). However, the impact of the difference 
between top and bottom fees is insignificant at standard levels, t-statistics being equal to 0.13. 
Surprisingly, the Number of arrangers who seek to bring into existence the syndicate has no impact 
on the Number of lenders who commit at the last stage. Last, the price discrimination has no impact 
on the number of banks joining the syndicate at standard significance levels. 
Conversely, the OLS estimate of the model described by equation (2) is reported in the third 
column of Table IV. Fees spread is determined by expected factors with expected signs. The 
expected renegotiations proxied by the Liquidity shortage indicator has a significant positive impact 
on the payment premium at standard levels (5%). This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
borrower will attempt to reduce the number of lenders as the prospect of renegotiations augments in 
order to increase lenders cohesion and reduce renegotiation costs, e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1996), Brunner and Krahnen (2001), Morris and Shin (2002). However, the amount of information 
already available to bankers has a positive impact on the spread. Probably, this is instead related to 
financial markets general risk exposure. 
Columns 4 and 5 present the results of the two-stage least squares estimate of the 
simultaneous equations model constituted of equations (1)-(2’). Interestingly, I find similar results   12 
as in the OLS models except that the number of joining lenders has a significant positive impact on 
the scale of the price discrimination among lenders at the 10% level. Therefore, the fee spread 
increases as the targeted number of joining lenders is larger at standard significance levels. 
Therefore, results provide little evidence of price discriminating on syndicated loans being 
aimed at reducing the number of lenders as related e.g. to Morris and Shin (2002) ‘common pool’ 
problem as well as the borrower’s attempt to reduce the renegotiation costs (Preece and Mullineaux 
(1996)). 
5.2. The quantity based price discrimination and the size of the loan 
The two stage-stage least squares estimates of the simultaneous equation models described 
by (1)-(2’) is presented in columns four and five of Table IV. The number of joining equation is 
unchanged with respect to OLS estimate, though. The size of the loan is found to be the strongest 
determinant with t-statistics equals 6.92. Again, the payment difference has no significant impact 
(z-statistics equals -0.19). As far as the Fees spread equation is concerned, I find a significant 
positive impact of the targeted number of banks joining the syndicate on the price discrimination at 
the standard 10% level (z-statistics equals 2.36). Apart from the number of joining determinant, 
other factors have the same significance as in OLS estimate of equation (2) presented in the third 
column of Table IV. Results imply that, all other things being equal, loans syndicated with a larger 
price discrimination is associated with more banks providing additional funds. 
Therefore, the quantity based price discrimination and the loan size seem more likely to be 
the suitable motivations for the presence of a difference in payments to lenders. Specifically, the 
fact that the pricing spread is aimed at increasing the number of lenders gives evidence of the price 
differences being aimed at targeting various lending. Additional estimates are presented in Table V. 
Indeed, adding number of ranks in equation (2) as in model (7) in Table V. The larger Fees spread 
is associated with a larger number of ranks in the syndicate at the 5% level (t-statistics equals 2.40). 
Therefore, I find evidence of the price discrimination reflecting higher costs incurred by the larger   13 
borrower who attempts to widen his set of lenders for financing ability purpose. This is consistent 
with Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Machauer and Weber (2000). 
5.3. The number of arranging banks 
Interestingly the number of institutions arranging the syndicate is instead negatively 
determined by default indicators (solvency) at the 0.05 level. Information asymmetries also 
significantly increase the number of arrangers at the 0.05 level. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the borrower will attempt to reduce information asymmetries by ‘hiring’ several 
trustworthy banks to improve the information distribution. However non-reported results show that 
the number of arrangers has no impact on the number of banks joining the syndicate. Therefore, 
additional borrowing costs the issuer is willing to pay out are function of the information 
asymmetries costs for a given targeted number of banks. However, the statistical performance of 
model (3) estimate being poor, I believe this result should be regarded as a descriptive result. 
6. Robustness 
Sensitivity 
I make sensitivity analyses to make sure the results in Table IV were robust to alternative 
independent variables and regression specifications. With regard to the independent variables, I 
replaced the Fees spread with Relative spread, and the number of joining lenders with the total 
number of lenders. Moreover, to make my results comparable with Esty and Megginson (2001) 
study, I also use the Mean tranche in the syndicate as a concentration indicator. Unfortunately, the 
number of observations providing with a complete report of commitments being too low, I was 
unable to calculate the same concentration ratios.
7 Results are reported in Table V. 
I find the Relative spread sensitive to most of factors that too determine the Fees spread in 
levels at standard levels, namely liquidity, Loan size, Lifetime. Relative spread is however 
                                                 
7 The number of observations with a detailed report of final commitments for each bank in the sample is of 19 only, 
thus insufficient for a robust statistical analysis of the Herfindhal concentration ratio.   14 
insignificantly affected by Public information and Variability of income growth. The Solvency 
indicator is again insignificant. These results are different from those presented in Table IV. 
Interestingly, the mean tranche is related to the same factors as the total number of lenders. 
Only the Number of arrangers has an additional negative impact as compared with the Number of 
joining banks. This is predictable since arrangers usually commit at top levels (highest shares) thus 
reducing the available share to other joining banks. 
I associate the positive impact of the size of the country’s international debt contracted from 
private creditors relative to the total LDCs international debts contracted from private creditors. 
Indeed other indicators of public information are insignificant at standard levels, namely the 
presence of bond markets for the particular country as well as GNP size. I also changed the 
liquidity indicator for either the ratio of foreign currencies reserves to the total amounts of shirt-
term debt and imports or the ratio of reserves to GNP without affecting the significance of the 
estimates. The substitution of the lifetime of the loan by the average lifetime had no impact on the 
results. 
Hence I can conclude my results are apparently robust. The main findings relate price 
discrimination on sovereign syndicated credits to the size of the loan and the attempt of the 
borrower to increase the number of lenders to obtain a successful syndication. 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper I analysed the price discrimination on syndicated loans contracted by 
sovereigns and its motivation. More specifically, the borrower together with his mandated arranger 
launch the loan syndication providing a higher compensation (in percentage points) if the 
committing lender finances a larger amount. The amount related premium is reflected in the up-
front fee (the up-front fee is a fee paid at the signature of the contract and before any instalment of 
the loan is yet disbursed). In particular I answer the question whether price discrimination affects 
the number of banks participating in the credit facility and relate the positive or negative impact to   15 
number of lending relationships issues. Alternatively, the borrower behaves alike the monopolist 
and exerts price discrimination to tap different lending markets and thus minimise his borrowing 
costs. 
I find a large impact of the size of the loan on the number of financial institutions joining 
the syndicate and the price gap. Price discrimination is also related to liquidity shortage associated 
distress and information asymmetries. The evidence of the minimising borrowing costs hypothesis 
and the size of the loan is the best fitted explanation for such a price gap. This is consistent with the 
financing ability and the borrowing costs minimisation hypotheses. It is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that the set of lenders is expanded in a poor legal environment such as sovereign debt 
markets. 
Interestingly, the investigation is extended to the number of arrangers. The arranging banks 
is the group of banks which collaborate with the issuing borrower to make the loan successful. I 
find the number of arrangers is significantly positively affected by asymmetries of information and 
the lifetime of the loan, while negatively related to the probability of repudiation. Nevertheless, 
their number has insignificant impact on the number of banks joining the syndicate. Therefore, I 
find evidence of arrangers behaving as a reducer of asymmetries of information for a given targeted 
number of joining banks. This also provides evidence of the existence of valuable private 
information in sovereign debt markets.   16 
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Table I 
Price Discrimination and Number of Lenders 
by Countries 
For each country, the table reports the number of loans contracted or guaranteed by sovereigns with the 
following information being required: the difference between the lowest and the highest fee paid up-front in 
percentage points (Fees spread) and the loan amount in constant 1995 US$ (Amount). The total number of 
lending institutions (Nb. lenders) and the number of banks joining the syndicate (Nb. joining) are also 
reported. The difference between Nb. lenders and Nb. joining is the number of arranging institutions 
participating in the facility. The sample of individual loans stems from the International Financing Review 
for the period 1990 to 1997. The reported values are mean values calculated over the sample period. 
Country  Nber of obs. reporting:  Fees spread  Amount  Nb. lenders
  Nb. joining
 
  Fees spread  Nb. lenders        
Algeria  1  0  0.1000  90.72  .  . 
China  5  4  0.2760  198.03  19.25  16.75 
Colombia  2  2  0.1875  261.77  23.50  21.50 
Czech Rep.  2  2  0.0375  140.39  13.50  12.50 
Ghana  2  1  0.1250  58.28  14.00  12.00 
Hungary  5  5  0.1520  46.36  11.00  8.00 
India  12  11  0.1229  88.94  13.73  10.27 
Kazakhstan  1  1  0.1250  47.06  15.00  14.00 
Lithuania  2  2  0.1375  82.30  16.50  7.00 
Malaysia  2  2  0.0000  120.22  6.00  5.00 
Oman  2  2  0.0112  342.22  45.00  36.50 
Philippines  3  2  0.1667  73.40  8.50  7.50 
Pakistan  3  1  0.0417  97.81  28.00  20.00 
Russian Fed.  1  1  0.2000  187.65  29.00  26.00 
South-Africa  5  5  0.0850  108.91  15.20  10.60 
Seychelles  1  1  0.3000  27.89  5.00  4.00 
South-Korea  4  4  0.2650  101.16  17.25  11.25 
Slovakia  1  1  0.0500  111.75  13.00  8.00 
Slovenia  2  2  0.1250  80.90  10.00  6.50 
Thailand  5  1  0.0790  78.82  70.00  64.00 
Turkey  29  26  0.2045  140.29  20.50  18.19 
Tunisia  3  3  0.0833  122.71  21.67  18.67 
Zimbabwe  7  6  0.1678  48.74  13.50  11.17 
Total  100  85  0.1570  115.61  17.96  14.76
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Highest and lowest fees are respectively the highest and the lowest fee in the syndicate in 
percentage points. Fees spread is the difference between Max and Min. Number of lenders is the 
number of financial institutions committing to lending for each loan contract after syndication. 
Number of joining lenders is the number of banks joining the syndicate. This equals the total 
number of lenders minus the number of committing arrangers. Joint-arrangers are however 
counted among the ‘joining banks.’ Loan size is the credit amount in constant 1995 US dollars. 
Liquidity is the ratio of foreign currency reserves relative to public and publicly guaranteed short-
term debt (less than a year maturity). The ratio proxies for the sovereign’s ability to repay in the 
short-run. Solvency is the ratio of long-term debt (more than a year maturity) relative to GNP. 
This proxies for the long-run ability to repay. In the sovereign context, this variable provides a 
proxy for the motivation for repudiating debt. Public information is the ratio of the country’s 
private creditors debt relative to the total less-developed countries private creditors debt. 
Variable  Num. of Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.
 
Fees spread  100  0.157  0.135 
Highest fee  100  0.550  0.543 
Lowest fee  100  0.390  0.484 
Number of lenders  85  17.96  11.248 
Number of joining lenders  85  14.76  10.681 
Loan size (millions 1995 USD)  100  115.61  119.06 
Liquidity 
Reserves to Short-term Debt 
100  2.211  4.154 
Solvency 
Long-term Debt to GNP 
100  0.260  0.135 
Public Information 
Country’s Bond and Bank Debt to 
all LDCs Bond and Bank Debt 
100  0.031  0.025 
Potential for information 
asymmetries 
Variability of income per capita 
growth in the last five years 
 
97  0.137  0.160 
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Table III 
Definition of variables 
Variable name  Definition 
Endogenous variables   
Fees spread  equals (Feemax – Feemin) where Feemax is the top up-front fee and Feemin is 
the bottom up-front fee. 
Relative spread  equals 
maxmin
min
AMarginAMargin
AMargin
-
 
AMarginmin and AMarginmax being respectively top and bottom ends all-in 
margins. The top (bottom) all-in margin equals the sum of the interest 
spread (annualised interest margin that takes account for pre-designed 
variations) and the top (bottom) end up-front fee calculated as a yearly 
margin over the lifetime of the loan. 
Number of arrangers  Total number of financial institutions mandated to arrange the loan 
syndication. 
Number of joining  Number of non-arranging banks that participate in the loan syndication 
and therefore provide funds. 
Number of lenders  Total number of financial institutions that participate in the syndicate, 
including all banks joining the syndicate as well as all arrangers holding a 
share of the loan after syndication. 
Mean tranche 
equals 
Loan size
Number of lenders
 
the average size of the committed tranche for each loan.   21
 
 
Table III  
Definition of variables (continued) 
Variable name  Definition 
Exogenous variables   
Liquidity  Ratio of foreign currencies reserves relative to short-term (lifetime under a 
year) foreign currency public and publicly guaranteed debts (PPG). 
Solvency  Ratio of public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) long-term debts relative to 
GNP. 
Public information  Ratio of the country’s total amount of PPG international debts contracted 
from private creditors (banking and bond debts) relative to all LDCs PPG 
long-term debts contracted from private creditors debts. 
Variability of income 
growth 
Five years variability of GNP per capita growth in the issuing economy. 
For country i, year j = 0, 
V(dIncome)i,j = 
( ) 0
,0
4
2
GNP per Capita growth GNP per capita growth over the last 5 years
5
ij
j
Average
=-
- ￿
 
Loan size 
Loan amount in billions of constant 1995 US dollars (indexed on US 
consumer prices). 
Lifetime  Loan time duration in number of years 
Number of ranks  Number of management rankings in the syndicate 
India  dummy=1 if India is the loan country of risk, 0 otherwise 
Turkey  dummy=1 if Turkey is the loan country of risk, 0 otherwise 
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Table IV 
Models estimates 
The models described by (1), (2) and (3) are estimated separately. Models (1) and (2) are 
estimated using OLS while (3) is estimated using the Tobit censured model. The system described 
by (1)-(2’) is estimated separately using two-stage least squares. Country dummies for India and 
Turkey were included. All variables are defined in Table III. Below the coefficient estimates t-
statistics are given in brackets for the OLS, z-statistics for the 2SL. Number of observations: 100 
reporting fees spread, 86 reporting both fees spread and the number of banks joining the syndicate, 
96 both the fees difference and the number of financial institutions arranging the loan. The 
effective number of observations used for the model estimate is however reduced because of the 
absence of three observations on the variability of income growth (see Table II). ***, **, * 
indicates respective significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. 
Eq.  (1)    (2)    (1)  (2’)    (3) 
Dependent var.  Number of 
joining 
  Fees spread    Number of 
joining 
Fees spread    Number of 
arrangers 
Fees Spread  1.066    .    -4.947  .    . 
  [0.13]    .    [-0.25]  .    . 
Number of  .    .    .  0.003
*    . 
joining  .    .    .  [1.80]    . 
Number of  0.140    .    0.199  .    . 
arrangers  [0.43]    .    [0.57]  .    . 
Liquidity  .    -0.020
**    .  -0.017
**    -0.026 
  .    [-2.45]    .  [-2.10]    [-0.10] 
Solvency  .    0.115    .  0.970    -5.375
* 
  .    [1.18]    .  [1.03]    [-1.65] 
Public Info  .    1.635
***    .  1.170
**    -10.019 
  .    [3.13]    .  [2.38]    [-0.59] 
Variability of  .    0.202
**    .  0.223
***    5.447
** 
income growth  .    [2.44]    .  [3.00]    [2.10] 
Loan size  0.562
***    0.190
*    0.572
***  .    -0106 
  [7.61]    [1.82]    [7.03]  .    [-0.03] 
Lifetime  -0.706
**    0.019
***    -0.619
*  0.023
***    0.032
** 
  [-2.45]    [4.57]    [-1.70]  [5.85]    [2.26] 
Constant  7.870    -0.015
    10.251
***  -0.047    2.010
 
  [3.89]    [-0.30]    [4.61]  [-0.87]    [1.26] 
R-squared  44.2    29.1    42.6  31.3    3.20 
All coeff.=0?  15.6    6.14    61.3  41.0    12.2 
N  85    97    82  82    94 
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Table V 
Further results 
All variables are defined in Table III. The Number of lenders, Number of joining, Fees spread, 
Relative spread are treated as endogenous. All other regressors are treated as exogenous. Model 
(4) substitutes the Mean tranche as the endogenous variable in model (1). Model (5) is the same as 
model (1), Number of lenders substituting the new endogenous variable. (6) is the same as (2), 
relative spread being the new endogenous variable. (1) and (2) are now modelled using the 
Instrumental variable statistical model (Fees spread being the instrument). t-statistics are given in 
italics below the coefficient estimates. Number of observations: 100 reporting fees spread, 86 
reporting both fees spread and the number of banks joining the syndicate, 96 both the fees 
difference and the number of financial institutions arranging the loan. The effective number of 
observations used for the model estimate is however reduced because of the absence of three 
observations on the variability of income growth (see Table II). ***, **, * indicates respective 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. 
Eq.  (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)     
Dependent var.  Mean 
tranche 
  Number of 
lenders 
  Relative 
spread 
  Fees spread     
Fees Spread  -2.420    1.895
    .    .     
  [-0.62]    [0.23]    .    .     
Number of  .    .    .    . 
   
joining  .    .    .    .     
Number of  -0.325
**    1.131
***    .    .     
arrangers  [-2.07]    [3.48]    .    .     
Number of  .    .    .    0.034
**     
ranks  .    .    .    [2.40]     
Liquidity  0.186    .    -0.009
**    -0.018
**     
  [0.68]    .    [-1.86]    [-2.17]     
Solvency  -2.944    .    0.094    0.120     
  [-0.89]    .    [1.63]    [1.26]     
Public Info  -6.648    .    0.155    1.364
***     
  [-0.38]    .    [0.51]    [2.61]     
Variability of  0.580    .    0.070    0.196
**     
income growth  [0.22]    .    [1.42]    [2.43]     
Loan size  0.260
***    0.563
***    0.126
**    0.074     
  [8.25]    [7.59]    [2.07]    [0.65]     
Lifetime  0.200    -0.714
**    -0.007
***    0.020
***     
  [1.17]    [-2.47]    [-3.08]    [4.96]     
Constant  4.900
***    9.624
***    0.075
**    -0.101     
  [3.00]    [5.27]    [2.63]    [-1.70]     
R-squared  54.6    49.1    29.0    33.4     
All coeff.=0?  10.7    19.0    6.1    6.37     
N  83    85    97    97     
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